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I. Introduction
This paper provides evidence on the short-and long-run performance of investments in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) on the Polish stock market 1 . The first objective of this study is to analyse IPO performance in the short-and long-run against a benchmark equity price index. The second objective is to find the main determinants of the IPO returns.
Most empirical studies demonstrate positive short-run returns for IPOs investments.
In contrast, mixed results are found with respect to the long-run performance of IPOs. Although some studies provide evidence on positive market adjusted long-run IPO returns, insignificant or negative long-run returns are found in most research papers.
The short-run performance of IPOs significantly varies across markets. Ecbo (2005) presents statistics on average initial IPO returns in 1990-2003 for 19 European countries and for 16 countries in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. In
Europe the highest average initial IPO returns were in Poland (over 60%) followed by Greece, Germany and Ireland (around 40%). In contrast, the lowest average initial returns were in Luxembourg (ca. 5%) and Denmark (less than 10%). In other regions the highest average initial IPO returns were in Malaysia (around 90%) followed by Thailand and Singapore (over 30%). The lowest average initial returns were in Latin American countries including Chile, Uruguay, Mexico and Brazil (less than 5%). An important conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that although the average initial returns vary significantly across markets, they are always positive. This observation is supported by other studies.
Al-Hassan et al (2007) analyse 47 IPOs on six markets in the Gulf region that went public between 2001 and 2006. They show that average initial return for these IPOs equaled 290%, which is one of the largest returns that can be found in the existing Introduction N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 6 1 literature 2 . Moreover, they demonstrate that although in a one-year horizon IPO returns beat the market benchmark, they turn negative once the initial returns are excluded, which is consistent with findings in other markets. Aggraval et al (2004) examine the relation between investor demand for shares offered in IPOs prior to the offerings and aftermarket performance of IPOs from 1993 to 1997 on the Hong Kong stock market. They find that IPOs with high investor demand have large positive initial returns but negative long-run excess returns. Consequently, IPOs with low investor demand have negative initial retrurns but positive long-run excess returns. Aussenegg (2000) analyses the performance of initial public offerings on the Polish stock market between 1991 and 1999 for two sets of companies: private and public sector. He demonstrates that these IPOs were significantly underpriced, as the average initial return equaled 38.5%. Moreover, the IPOs of public sector companies yielded significantly higher returns that the private ones (65.6% and 25.3% on average respectively). The long-run performance of the private and public sector companies was not significantly different from each other. During the first three years of aftermarket trading they neither under-nor overperformed benchmarks. Lyn and Zychowicz (2002) Authors find that primary determinant of initial returns on these markets was market momentum, i.e. the percentage change in the local market index one month prior to the offering day. An interesting finding is that size of the offer was not found significantly related to initial returns. This is in contrast with asymmetric information theories which claim that the larger the offer the lower the information asymmetry thus lower the level of underpricing. In contrast to Aussenegg they do not find any significant difference between the underpricing of privatization and nonprivatization IPOs.
Sukacz ( IPOs' undepricing was positively related to number of days and change of the broad market index WIG between the last day of the subscription period to the first day of listing, and it was negatively related to such financial ratios as P/E and P/BV. In contrast to Aussenegg (2000) he claims that average initial return on IPOs of private companies was higher than on IPOs of privatized firms and equaled 27.4% and 25.5% respectively. Moreover, he finds that initial return on IPOs of smaller companies (i.e. listed on the WSE parallel market) was higher than of larger firms (i.e. listed on the WSE main market).
Rhee (2002) analyses 803 IPOs on the US stock market in 1999 and 2000, i.e. during the internet bubble. He finds that the average initial returns were 72% and 56%
respectively. This is significantly higher than the average initial return for IPOs conducted on the US market between 1990 and 2001 which equaled 24.2%. 182 of these IPOs yielded initial returns of 100% or more. In addition, IPOs of firms with negative earnings prior to the offer yielded higher initial returns than those with Introduction N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d In the analysed period the average cost of raising capital via equity issues on the WSE was relatively stable and stayed in the range 4.0-5.0% of the offer value. For comparison the interest rates on bank loans with maturity 1-5 years granted to non-financial companies stayed in the range 4.0-10.0% annually. Table 1 . N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 12 3
III. Data Selection and Sample Construction
The data set includes 314 companies which conducted IPOs on the WSE between 2003 and 2011. The sample was divided using a criterion of type of the IPO:private domestic company, privatization, migration from other market, foreign companynew share issue, foreign dual-listed company.
During the period under analysis investors were very keen on buying shares of privatized companies 10 . One of the possible explanations is that they believed that shares of these firms were sold with a discount relative to public offers of shares by companies run by private owners. This might root from presumption that the Treasury's main goal was to carry out privatization and not necessarily to maximize proceeds from the offer, as it is in case of offers of privately run companies (see for example Aussenegg (2000)).
Private domestic companies prevailed among firms that entered the WSE between 10 During the privatisations of Bank PKO BP in 2004 and the oil company Grupa Lotos, investors filed for a record value of bank loans for purchases of equities, i.e. PLN 16.7 billion and PLN and PLN 6.9 billion, respectively. 11 RPW CeTO is an off-exchange regulated market. To read more, the official website is: http://www.mts-ceto.pl and www.bondspot.pl.
IV. Methodology and Basic Descriptive Statistics
A. Initial Return, Abnormal Initial Return and Aftermarket Abnormal Returns
Initial Return
An IPO's initial return is calculated by taking the difference between the issue price and the closing price on the first day of trading as follows:
where IRi is the gross initial return for security i from the last day of the subscription period to the closing of the first day of trading, Pi,t is the closing price of security i at the first day of trading, Pi,0 is the issue price of security i at the time of
The initial return gives us the first glimpse of the profitability of an IPO investment but it is not an accurate measure of investment profitability in real market conditions, as one must take into consideration several factors that may affect the rate of return. Firstly, in hot periods on the IPO market investors usually do not get all shares they have subscribed for, which is a widely known phenomenon called oversubscription. In this situation, they bear extra costs of "freezing" a part of their capital in the subscription. This problem augments when investors anticipate reduction and use bank loan (leverage) to get the number of shares they want.
Leverage involves additional costs for investors, as banks (and brokerage houses) charge investors for granting the credit and interests for using it. Using leverage also means additional risk for investors. If the oversubscription is lower than they have predicted, they get more shares than they wanted. Lower oversubscription means poorer demand for a company's shares and is often associated with lower initial returns 13 . We suppose that instead of buying shares in an IPO an investor would otherwise buy a market portfolio which may be proxied by the broad market index, 12 This approach is used (among others) by Al-Hassan et al. (2007) .
13 See Aggraval and Liu (2004) .
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in our case the WIG index. Secondly, every transaction generates costs for investors, such as brokerage commissions which negatively affect initial returns. Thirdly, we must take into consideration taxes, which also negatively affect initial returns of IPOs. In Poland, the capital gains tax rate was introduced on 01.01.2004 and equaled 19%. For the sake of simplicity we assume that investors pay capital gains taxes on every transaction that yields positive returns. Consequently, there is no possibility to deduct suffered losses in the following transactions.
Abnormal Initial Return
To calculate a return for an investor who buys shares in an IPO and sells them on the first day of trading at the close price (the Abnormal Initial Return -AIR) we must adjust Formula 1. as follows
where WIG is the average daily WIG index growth in the period d. TC is the transaction cost for each security of company i. In our case we assume that the transaction cost for each IPO equaled 0.8% (0.4% for buying and 0.4% for selling equities) which was the most common fee that brokerage houses charged individual clients for buying and selling equities. P avg is the average transaction price of IPO shares and WIG avg is the average price for buying and selling market portfolio. 0.81 is a factor that reflects capital gains tax rate.
Aftermarket Abnormal Return
In literature there are several methods to calculate the aftermarket performance of IPOs, and there is no consensus which one yields better results 15 . In this paper we assume that an investor follows the buy and hold strategy, i.e. buys shares offered in 14 Similar approach is used by Al Hassan et al. Our equations differ only in one aspect. Al Hassan et al. use the average risk-free rate which is proxied by the one-month bank customer deposit rates to reflect the alternative cost of the IPO investment. We believe that a better alternative for IPO investment is other equity investment, namely investing in the market portfolio. Therefore we use WIG index change as a proxy for alternative cost. 15 See for example: Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Brav and Gompers, 1997; and Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999. an IPO and holds them until the selling day. We analyse IPO aftermarket performance in three different horizons, i.e. one, three and twelve months. We assume that each month has 30 days and the year has 365 days. By calculating abnormal return we are interested if an IPO investment yields higher or lower return than the benchmark portfolio. For the sake of simplicity we do not take into consideration transaction costs and taxes as they would influence both investments (in IPO shares and market portfolio) in the same way and by the same strength. To calculate Aftermarket Abnormal Return (AAR) we use the following formula:
where AARi,t is the buy and hold abnormal return for security i in the period t (which in our case is a) 1 month, b) 3 months or c) 12 months), Pi,t is the security i price in the period t, Pi,1 is the closing price on the first trading day, WIGi,t is the WIG index level in the period t and WIGi,1 is the WIG index level at the end of the first day of trading of security i.
Average AAR greater than zero indicates that, on average, investment in IPOs outperformed the market, which means that an investor would be better off investing in shares of companies that were introduced to trading on the stock exchange than investing in the market portfolio. On the contrary if average AAR is smaller than zero investor would achieve greater return while investing in the market portfolio instead of buying IPO shares. This approach will give us an answer whether it is better to sell share on the IPO day or sell them one month, three months or one year after the IPO day. 
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IPOs with negative initial returns is quite high (83 or 26% af all offers). In general the negative initial returns stayed in the relatively narrow range, i.e. from -10% to 0%. In contrast 50 IPOs (almost 16% of the total number of offers) yielded over 25%. Detailed figures are presented in Table 2 . and Figure 2 . The curtosis of initial returns distribution is positive which means that observations are closer to the mean than in normal distribution. At the same time the skewness is also positive which means that there were IPOs with returns significantly departing from the average (long right tails). We must point out that the aforementioned descriptive statistics are significantly affected by two offers which yielded 395.5% and 481.3% (Figure 2. ). and equaled 19%. The third factor not only has the largest impact on investors' net returns but it also increases investment risk. If investors do not take into account reductions while subscribing for shares, they will get lower allocation than they wanted. In consequence, their net returns will be lower as only part of the capital will be invested in IPO shares and only this capital will generate returns from underpricing. The rest of funds will be "frozen" for many days until the subscription is finished. Investors who expect reduction may lever themselves (i.e. take bank loan) for buying IPO shares and get the allocation they want. But taking such a loan generates additional risk. Let's suppose that an investor assumed that the reduction rate would be 90% and he takes a bank loan to subscribe for ten times more shares than he actually wants to buy. If his assumption is correct he will buy exactly the number of shares that he wanted. If the reduction rate is higher than he predicted he will be allocated less shares than he wanted, and symmetrically if the reduction rate is lower than he has predicted he will be allocated more shares than he wanted. The last possibility is the worst possible for the investor as lower reduction rates mean lower demand for IPO shares and is often associated with lower initial returns. When initial returns are negative and the reduction rate is lower than he expected it means huge losses. We must underline that it is very hard to measure uncertainty associated with reduction rates and in practice investors must rather rely on their intuition than on models and equations.
Although from the point of view of investors the positive average initial return is vital it means that companies which carried public offers to gather funds and company owners that wanted to exit investments via IPO, collected less capital than it was theoretically possible. In literature this effect is known as money left on the 
Abnormal Initial Return
The average AIR in 2003-2011 equaled 2.9% and was by 11.3 pp lower than the initial return. This means that IPO investments were profitable on net basis, i.e. after 16 For definition please see e.g. Ritter, J.R. (2006) . 17 The value of money left on the table presented in percents (11.4%) was lower than initial return (14.2%) because in general smaller offers showed higher degree of underpricing than large offers. Moreover, there were IPOs with negative initial returns. The percentage value of money left on the table may be considered as average initial return weighted by the IPO value.
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adjustments for reduction rate, alternative cost (market portfolio return), transaction costs and taxes. What is interesting the number of offers with positive returns significantly fell dawn and the number of offers with high returns (over 25%) also significantly decreased. The AIRs cluster more around the mean than it is observed in case of initial returns (higher curtosis) but there are some observations that significantly depart from the average (high positive skewness), which is observed as a long right tail. What affects most this results is the RED parameter. The general conclusion that can be drawn is that offers with high reductions rates had a high underpricing. Detailed figures for AIRs are presented in Table 2 . and Figure 3 . The average IR of the privatized companies was in the middle of the ranking.
Looking at the AIR we can see a totally different picture. By far the highest return had companies that migrated to the WSE from two other markets. The lowest AIR was in case of privatized companies. What is more the return on investment in foreign companies that dual-listed their shares on the WSE was higher than of the foreign companies that carried new share issues.
The differences in IR and AIR are mostly influenced by reduction rates. Although
IPOs of private domestic companies had the highest IR they were influenced most by the reductions and thus offered relatively small AIR. 
Aftermarket Abnormal Returns
As it can be seen from the Table 2 . IPO returns turn negative in one month, three months and one year period. Holding shares one and three months after the IPO day results in -1.1 and -1.0% returns respectively. What is more holding shares one year results in even more negative return -4.2%. Looking at the median AAR we can draw a conclusion that the best strategy for and investor who buys shares in an IPO is to sell them on the IPO day. Only in this case (on average) he realizes profit on the transaction. After that day the longer he holds the shares the higher loses he incurs. 
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V. Investment strategies
We assume than investors buy shares on the last day of the subscription period and sell them on the first day of listing at the close price. This assumption is the same as used in calculation of initial return.
Taking in to account the aforementioned factors which affect IPO net returns in this paper we will consider two investment strategies which only differ in the use of leverage. The first strategy assumes that investors subscribe for IPO shares using only their own funds (Strategy I). The second one assumes that investors when subscribing for shares expect oversubscription and use leverage to get the number of shares equal to the value of their own funds (Strategy II). This means that if the expected reduction rate is higher investors will lever themselves more. We assume that expected reduction rate equals the average realized reduction rate in a given sub- Using leverage involves additional cost for investors. Based on the empirical data we assume that in every IPO investors were charged a fixed fee for being granted a loan and they were charged 15% annually for using the loans.
In both strategies we adjust results for transaction costs (for buying and selling shares) which equaled 0.8% (i.e. 0.4% for buying and 0.4% for selling shares) and capital gain taxes.
This approach allows us to get the real net return for investors from IPO investments.
The results of both strategies can be seen in the Table 3 . As we can see from the Table 4 . the picture is mixed. On one hand investors were better off choosing the Strategy II but using leverage would boost rate of return only by a mere 0.9 pp. On the other hand the median was negative which drives us to the conclusion that over half of the returns in Strategy II was negative.
What is more if we look on the standard deviations we can see that Strategy II was far much more risky than Strategy I. This is confirmed by the distance between minimum and maximum returns obtained in both strategies.
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VI. Determinants of Initial Returns
In literature one may find many theories attempting to explain IPO underpricing on the equity markets. They may be grouped in four broad categories 18 : asymmetric information, institutional, ownership and control and behavioral. Asymmetric information models assume that among the parties involved in a deal, i.e. the issuing firm, the broker advising in a deal and the new investors, one or two of them know more than the others. In consequence, this results in information frictions that cause underpricing. Institutional theories focus on features of the market: possible litigation issues, the price stabilizing activities of brokers once trading starts and taxes. Ownership and control theories claim that underpricing helps shape the shareholder base so as to reduce intervention by outside shareholders once the company is public. Behavioral theories can be divided in two groups. The first one assumes the presence of "irrational" investors who bid up the price of IPO shares beyond the true value. The second one claims that a company that carries the IPO does not put enough pressure on the advising broker to set the issue price relatively higher. The broker wants to maximize the success of the IPO and low issue price raises the probability of the success.
In this study we will check how two of the aforementioned theories explain IPO underpricing on the WSE 19 . We will verify the possible impact on the initial return of the asymmetric information and behavioral factors.
Proxies:
a) Ex-ante uncertainty (PEV, positive): One of the possible explanations for IPO underpricing is that issuers anticipate investors' ex-ante uncertainty regarding the future performance of IPOs. Investors are less informed about a company's growth potential than its managers, and the company's managers (and broker) know less about the aggregate demand for shares than the whole market. Thus, two types of 18 Ljungqvist (2006) . 19 In this study we do not include institutional factors because for most of the offers they were the same, e.g. litigation procedures did not change during analysed period.
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information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders exist. Therefore, underpricing is required to attract investors to buy offered shares. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the underpricing needed to attract investors. Companies try to minimize the information asymmetry by organizing road shows, during which company managers (and offering brokers) can learn about potential demand for company's shares among investors and investors can learn about the company itself. This, from two sides, may reduce the information asymmetry. Another measure which is aimed at reducing company uncertainty about potential demand for its shares is to slice the tranche of offered shares into two pieces and offer as many shares as possible to institutional investors. In contrast to the individual investors' tranche, in the institutional investors' tranche generally we do not observe pronounced oversubscription
20
. This is due to different methods of offering shares to these two groups of investors.
Brokers contact large investors to asses potential demand for offered shares
21
.
Afterward these investors are allocated the exact number of shares they want. This is a win-win situation for the offering company and large investors as the company has assured the demand for its shares and institutional investors do not unnecessarily freeze capital in the subscription phase. By contrast, individual investors subscribe for shares declaring the number and the maximum price they are willing to pay for them. They are not sure what allocation they will get, and it is conversely related the to the aggregate demand for these shares.
In several studies age of the firm has been used as a risk proxy, as one might expect that well established firms are less risky than start-ups. Also reputation of underwriters may serve as a proxy for ex-ante risk (e.g. Manaster, 1990, Booth and Booth, 2003) . This is based on the assumption that high reputation underwriters process more complete information than investors and they normally underwrite securities of low risk firms to avoid losing reputational capital. Ritter (1984) as a proxy for the ex-ante uncertainty uses standard deviation of daily returns 20 Only in 23 cases in our sample of 314 IPOs we observed oversubscription in institutional investor's tranche. 21 Gondat-Larralde and James (forthcoming).
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of each individual IPO 25 days following its official listing. Knopf and Teall (1999) argue that Parkinson's Extreme Value (PEV) calculated for the first trading day is a superior estimate for ex-ante uncertainty. PEV measures the volatility of the security return during the first day of trading, and is calculated as follows:
where, Pi,0 max is the maximum price for security i during the first trading day and Pi,0 min is the minimum price for price for security i during the first trading day. In this study we will use PEV as a proxy for ex-ante risk.
b) Oversubscription (RED, positive): Oversubscription may indicate the potential demand for offered shares from part of the investors. Higher oversubscription means higher demand. Investors who were allocated fewer shares than they had subscribed for may create additional demand during the first trading day, which may drive prices up. Therefore, the higher the oversubscription, the higher the underpricing is.
Some empirical studies have confirmed this positive relation (Rock (1986 ), Paudyal et al (1998 ). Oversubsription is measured as a relation of an IPO's demand for shares to their supply. This relation was described by Menyah et al (1995) in the United Kingdom and by Paudyal et al (1998) in Malaysia. These authors as a proxy for market volatility use the standard deviation of daily market returns over a two-month period prior to the last day of the subscription period. In this study we will use similar approach but we higher than during bearish times, as investors tend to be overoptimistic about future IPO performance when overall market conditions are favorable. How et al. (1995) demonstrate that on the Australian IPO market the level of underpricing during bull periods is high and during bear periods is low. Thus, the relation between bullish periods and IPO underpricing is positive. In our analysis market sentiment is taken into consideration by introducing a dummy variable. 
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VII. Empirical Results
The estimation of our model shows that the only four proxies are significant at the 0.001 level. These were PEV, RED , FAD and TRN . The model looks as follows: suggests that co m p a n i e s did not put enough pressure on the offeri n g brokers to set higher issue prices. Bearin g in m i n d that after m a r k e t abn o r m a l retu r n s are sma l l e r and smal l e r as the ti m e passes by we can dra w a conc l u s i o n that the first theo r y the ex is te n c e of irrat i o n a l in v es t o r s) is more probable.
W h a t ma y be stri k i n g is that t here is no significant relationship between the initial return and the size of the offer (INV). This suggests that in terms of information To sum up, the regression results support our theory that both information asymmetry and behavioral factors explain part of the IPO underpricing in Poland.
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VIII. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The major objective of this paper is to provide documentation of the initial return The size of the offerings was not found significantly related to initial returns. This means that large offers do not reveal more information than small IPOs. It may be considered as a positive conclusion because it proofs that the requirements put on issuers to reveal important information to investors are well executed in Poland.
What may be striking market volatility is not significant proxy for IPO underpricing.
In general during volatile market conditions companies rather postpone their IPOs than offer shares to investors with huge discounts. Structure of the offers is also an insignificant factor of underpricing. It shows that investors do not care what proportion of shares companies offer and if company owners sell their shares or not.
Market sentiment was not significant either as a factor influencing the IPO underpricing. It may root form the fact that during bull markets investors are keen on buying IPO shares which contributes to their underpricing and during bear periods companies lower issue prices to attract investor. For this reason underpricing during the bull periods can be considered to be demand driven and during the bear periods it can be treated as supply driven. Nevertheless, this needs further investigation.
